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NOTE
Indian Gaming and Tribal-State Negotiations:
Who Should Decide the Issue of Bad Faith?
I. Introduction
The spread of legalized gambling is one of the most controversial issues in
America today. Despite the fact that revenues from gaming on Indian reservations and
trust lands comprise only six percent of the national market,' Indian gaming has gen-
erated a fervent legal controversy that pits supporters of tribal sovereignty against state
governments that wish to regulate and control the gaming activities that take place
within their borders.
In 1988, Congress provided a statutory framework for Indian gaming when it
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA").2 Shortly before passage of the
IGRA, the Supreme Court held that state gaming laws could not be applied to tribal
Indians on their reservations without an express provision by Congress.' In passing the
IGRA, Congress granted the states a limited but significant role in the regulation of
Indian gaming. Under the IGRA, an Indian tribe must operate any casino gaming en-
terprises (referred to as 'Class HI' gaming) within the confines of a tribal-state com-
pact entered into by the tribe and the state within which the casino is located. The
IGRA imposes upon the states a duty to negotiate in good faith with a tribe wishing to
enter a tribal-state compact. In order to enforce this duty to negotiate in good faith, the
IGRA creates a federal cause of action that may be initiated by an Indian tribe against
a state that refuses to negotiate a compact or that fails to negotiate in good faith. If a
tribe brings such an action and the court finds that the state has not negotiated in good
faith, the court must order the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within sixty
days. If a compact is not concluded within sixty days, the state and tribe must submit
to binding mediation. The Secretary of the Interior has the power to disapprove a
tribal-state compact.4 Then, in 1996, the Supreme Court struck down the federal cause
of action created by the IGRA, holding that a federal suit by an Indian tribe against a
state violates state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.' The Supreme
Court's holding left the tribes with no readily apparent legal remedy should a state
refuse to negotiate a gaming compact or refuse to negotiate in good faith.6
1. Senator John McCain, Forward to Symposium, Indian Gaming, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1997);
Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal- State Compacts
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 25, 82 (1997).
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2721 (1994).
3. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
4. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994).
5. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
6. Under established jurisdictional law, a tribe could theoretically sue a state in state court in
order to enforce its rights under the IGRA. See Tafflin v. Levit, 493 U.S. 455, 458-59 (1990); Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). At least one author has noted that be-
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In the wake of the Court's Seminole ruling, the Secretary of the Interior has
proposed rules for the creation of Class III gaming regulations in the absence of a
valid tribal-state compact! Under the Secretary's proposed rules, a tribe may ask the
Secretary to approve guidelines for Class III gaming after it has brought suit against a
state under the IGRA and after the state has successfully asserted its 11t' Amendment
defense. At the time that it requests the Secretary to approve Class III gaming, the
tribe must submit a proposal containing prospective regulations. If the state submits an
alternative proposal, the Secretary's proposed regulations call for a mediation process
similar to that described by the IGRA. If the state does not submit an alternative pro-
posal, however, the proposed regulations give the Secretary the power to interpret state
gaming laws, determine whether the state has negotiated in good faith, and, ultimately,
promulgate Class III gaming regulations despite the fact that no tribal-state compact
has been reached
In this Note, I argue that the Secretary of the Interior's proposed regulations
exceed the Secretary's legal authority and upset the delicate balance of interests
reached by Congress when it passed the IGRA. In Part II, I examine the IGRA in
more detail and explore Congress' intent in creating the federal cause of action autho-
rized in the statute. In Part III, I evaluate the Secretary's proposed regulations and
show that they both exceed the Secretary's lawful authority and skew the balance
between state and tribal interests created in the IGRA. Finally, in Part IV, I investigate
a possible alternative to the rules proposed by the Secretary.
II. IGRA - A Delicate Compromise
A. The Common Law Prior to IGRA: California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians
The controversy in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians9 arose when
the State of California sought to apply its law restricting the playing of bingo'0 to the
bingo games conducted on the reservations of the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of
Mission Indians. California is a Public Law 280" state, which means that its criminal
laws are applicable to Indians in Indian country, but that its civil and regulatory laws
are not. 2 The issue in Cabazon was whether California's bingo restrictions were
cause the IGRA does not explicitly makc federal jurisdiction over tribal claims exclusive, state courts
presumptively have concurrent jurisdiction. James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution To State
Soveriegn Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe,
46 UCLA L. REV. 161, 186 & n.108 (1998). Because the tribes do not perceive the states to be
particularly friendly to their interests, however, they have been reluctant to resort to state courts. See
WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 311-12 (3d ed. 1998). As one writer has pointed
out, "[i]f the purpose of federal . . . authority over Indian affairs is the perceived inability of states to
deal fairly with Indian tribes, it seems perverse to require enforcement of Indian rights in state court."
Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J.
3, 22 (1997).
7. Class Ill Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1998) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291)
(proposed Jan. 22, 1998).
8. See id. at 3294-96.
9. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (Doering 1997).
11. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-62, 25
U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1984)).
12. See generally, WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 225-29 (3d ed. 1998).
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properly classified as criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory. 3 The court found that
the California law, which permits bingo games under certain circumstances, 4 was
regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature, and thus held that the state could not en-
force its restrictions against the Indian bingo operations in question. 5
The Cabazon decision, which essentially meant that a state could not regulate
Indian gaming unless it prohibited in all instances the type of gaming in question, is
commonly credited with contributing to the growth of Indian gaming" and spurring
Congress to regulate the Indian casino industry. 7 Among the Congressional findings
listed at the start of the IGRA is a restatement of the Court's holding in Cabazon:
"Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if
the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted
within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit
such gaming activity." 8
B. Creating A Role For The States
In the' wake of the Cabazon decision, Congress responded to ever-increasing
pressure from the states 9 and sought a compromise by enacting the IGRA. The IGRA
divides all gaming activity into three classes. Class I gaming, consisting of ceremonial
and social games with prizes of minimal value,' falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the tribes and is not affected by the IGRA.2' Class II gaming consists of bingo and
similar games, as well as those card games not prohibited by state law and played in
accordance with state restrictions.' Class II gaming is also within the jurisdiction of
the tribes if it is authorized by a tribal ordinance and conducted within a state that
"permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity."23 (In
this regard, the IGRA clearly reflects the reasoning behind the Cabazon decision).
IGRA restricts how Class II revenues may be used24 and requires the chairman of the
National Indian Gaming Commission's approval of any tribal ordinance authorizing
Class II gaming.' Class II gaming specifically excludes banking card games such as
baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack, as well as electronic or electro-mechanical fac-
13. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209.
14. The California statute permits bingo games that are conducted by charitable organizations and
have pots of $250 or less. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5(a) & (n) (Deering 1997).
15. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 210-12.
16. See, e.g., Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 501, 502 (1995); Karen
S. McFadden, Note, The Stakes Are Too High To Gamble Away Tribal Self-Government, Self-Sufficien-
cy, And Economic Development When Amending the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L.
807, 810 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 769, 774 (1995), Sean Brewer, Note, Analysis of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in Light
of Current Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 469, 481 (1995).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994).
19. See, e.g., CANBY, supra note 12, at 287; Stephanie A. Levin, Betting on the Land: Indian
Gambling and Sovereignty, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 125, 127 (1997).
20. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1994).
21. See id. § 2710(a)(1).
22. See id. § 2703(7).
23. See id. § 2710(b)(1).
24. See id. § 2710(b)(3).
25. See id. § 2710(b)(2). The National Indian Gaming Commission is a three member panel creat-
ed by the IGRA at § 2704.
1999]
Journal of Legislation
similes of any game of chance, or slot machines of any kind.' Class III gaming is
defined as all forms of gaming that are not included in Class I or Class Iil
In order to offer Class III gaming, including typical casino games like craps,
roulette, blackjack, and slot machines, a tribe must meet three requirements under
IGRA. First, the tribe must adopt a resolution authorizing Class III gaming which is
approved by the chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission. Second, the
Class HI enterprise must be located within a state "that permits such gaming for any
purpose by any person, organization, or entity." Third, the enterprise must be operated
in accordance with a tribal-state compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the
state.2
The tribal-state compacting process begins when the Indian tribe requests that the
state enter into negotiations for creating a tribal-state compact that will govern the
Class III gaming operations planned by the tribe. Upon receiving a tribe's request to
negotiate, a state has a duty to negotiate with the tribe in good faith.' The Secretary
of the Interior may only disapprove of a compact reached by a tribe and a state if the
compact violates the IGRA or any other provision of federal law not pertaining to
gaming, or if it violates the trust obligation of the United States to the Indians. If the
Secretary approves a tribal-state compact, or if he takes no action for 45 days after it
is submitted for his approval, the compact takes effect.'
If a state refuses to enter into negotiations, or fails to negotiate in good faith,
IGRA creates a cause of action for the tribe in federal court. If the tribe introduces
evidence that the state: (1) has not entered into a compact with the tribe and (2) has
refused to negotiate or has failed to negotiate in good faith, the state will have the
burden of proving that it did negotiate in good faith to conclude a Class III gaming
compact with the tribe. If the court finds that the state has indeed failed to negotiate in
good faith, it must order the state to conclude a compact with the tribe within 60 days.
In making a finding of bad faith, the court may consider the public interest,
public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and the economic impact on existing
gaming activities. In addition, the IGRA explicitly sets out a demand by the state to
tax the Indian tribe as evidence of bad faith. If the tribe and the state fail to conclude a
compact within 60 days of the court's order, each party must submit its last best offer
to a mediator appointed by the court. The mediator will then select the offer which
best comports with the findings of the court and the applicable federal laws and submit
his decision to the tribe and the state. If the state consents to the chosen compact with-
in 60 days, it becomes effective. If the state does not consent within 60 days, then the
Secretary of the Interior must prescribe Class III gaming procedures which are consis-
tent with the relevant provisions of state law and with the compact selected by the
mediator."
The complex set of rules outlined above was the result of a congressional com-
promise between the demands of state and tribal governments. As Indian gaming grew
more prevalent, the states lobbied heavily for federal regulation of gaming on Indian
26. See id. § 2703(7)(B).
27. See id. § 2703(8).
28. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(1).
29. See id. § 2710(d)(3).
30. See id. § 2710(d)(8).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7).
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lands, fearing that unregulated Indian gaming would lead to unfair competition with
state-regulated gaming and an infiltration of organized crime.32 Indian tribes, on the
other hand, saw the Cabazon decision as an affirmation of their sovereign rights and
protested the need for any congressional legislation. 3 Prior to the passage of the
IGRA, numerous regulatory schemes had been introduced in Congress. These earlier
bills presented a wide range of alternatives, from reserving nearly all regulatory powers
in the Secretary of the Interior and the tribes, 34 to granting the states comprehensive
power to regulate Class III gaming on Indian lands.' The IGRA represents an amal-
gamation of ideas presented in these earlier bills,' with the tribal-state compacting
process as the key provision for addressing and balancing the interests of the tribes and
the states with regard to Class III gaming activities.'
When it created the IGRA's federal cause of action, Congress expressed concern
that states might use the Act's compacting process as a way to exclude tribes from
gaming or as a tool for protecting state-licensed gaming from free market competi-
tion.' In order to ensure that the states dealt with the tribes in good faith, Congress
elected, "as the least offensive option," to grant the tribes the right sue the states in
federal court." In the view of Congress, the IGRA's provision allowing tribes to seek
a judicial finding of bad faith on the part of the states was the best way to "balanc[e]
the interests and rights of the tribes to engage in gaming against the interests of States
in regulating such gaming." 0
C. Confusion Erupts-Seminole Tribe v. Florida
In 1996, the Supreme Court threw tribal-state compacting law into confusion
when it handed down its decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida."' In a 5-4 decision,
the Court struck down the IGRA's provision authorizing an Indian tribe to bring suit in
federal court against a state that had refused to bargain in good faith for a Class III
gaming compact. The Court held that Congress lacked the power under the Indian
Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court.' The Seminole case was a major decision on the meaning of the Elev-
enth Amendment, with ramifications far beyond the field of Indian gaming law.43 Its
immediate impact, however, was to leave Indian tribes with no clear remedy in the
event that a state refused to negotiate a Class III gaming compact in good faith. The
32. Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A Forum for Conflict Among the
Plenary Powers of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendnent, 18 VT. L. REV. 127,
133 (1993).
33. Tsosie, supra note 1, at 49.
34. See H.R. 4566, 98th Cong. (1983).
35. See H.R. 1920, 99th Cong. (Senate version dated Sept. 26, 1986); For a systematic overview
of Indian gaming bills proposed prior to the passage of the IGRA, see Roland J. Santoni, The Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act: How Did We Get Here? Where Are We Going? 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 387,
395-403 (1993).
36. Santoni, supra note 35, at 404.
37. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3083.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 14, reprinted at 3084.
40. Id.
41. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
42. Id. at 53 - find pg in us reports
43. Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ.
ST. LJ. 1, 1 (1997).
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decision has been attacked on constitutional grounds by numerous authors, ' and sev-
eral alternatives have been offered in its aftermath. Among the legal possibilities men-
tioned in the wake of the Seminole decision were a return to the common law under
Cabazon,4 pursuit of tribal rights in state court' , administrative rule-making by the
Secretary of the Interior,' and a duty of the U.S. Attorney General to litigate the is-
sue of good faith on behalf of the tribes.' Although each of these alternatives has its
advantages and disadvantages, the need to end the current state of confusion is a press-
ing one. According to one expert, "[w]hatever the ultimate outcome of the attempts to
respond to the Seminole decision, no one argues that the present condition of uncer-
tainty is satisfactory."'
III. The Secretary of the Interior's Proposed Regulations
Shortly after the Seminole decision, the Secretary of the Interior decided to pur-
sue the creation of administrative regulations that would allow for Class III gaming in
the event that a state refused to negotiate in good faith with a tribe and asserted its
Eleventh Amendment defense to a suit under the IGRA. In May of 1996, the Secretary
requested comment on the issue,"e and in January of 1998, he issued his proposed
regulations." By proposing regulations that have the potential to define the law in the
aftermath of the Seminole decision, the Secretary of the Interior has focused the con-
troversy surrounding the tribal-state compacting process. An examination of his pro-
posed rules is essential in order to address effectively the issue of post-Seminole Class
III gaming negotiations.
A. The Text of the Proposed Rules
The Secretary's proposed rules begin by asserting that, "the department has con-
cluded that it has the authority to prescribe procedures permitting Class III gaming
when a State interposes its immunity from suit by an Indian Tribe."52 After a concise
yet thorough argument in support of the Secretary's authority to issue the regula-
tions,53 the proposed rules set out a procedure that, with some important differences,
roughly tracks a portion of the procedures given by the IGRA. Under the proposed
rules, a tribe would be eligible to ask the Secretary to issue Class III gaming proce-
44. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV.
102 (1996); Shannon Bacon, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: What Congress Giveth, The
Court Taketh Away, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569 (1997); Nancy J. Bride, Note, Seminole Tribe v.
Florida: The Supreme Court's Botched Surgery of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 24 J. LEGIS. 149
(1998).
45. Colleen F. Walsh, Note, Congress's Article I Powers May Not Abrogate State Sovereign Im-
munity Granted By The Eleventh Amendment and Ex Parte Young Is Inapplicable To Suits Brought
Under The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 806, 835 (1997).
46. Pfander, supra note 6, at 186 & n.108.
47. Bacon, supra note 45, at 604.
48. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on Indian Reservations: Defining the Trustee's Duty in the
Wake of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 120, 162 (1997).
49. CANBY, supra note 12, at 312.
50. Request for Comments on Establishing Departmental Procedures To Authorize Class Ill Gam-
ing on Indian Lands When a State Raises an Eleventh Amendment Defense to Suit Under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 21394 (1996).
51. Class Ill Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1998) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291)
(proposed Jan. 22, 1998).
52. Id. at 3289.
53. See discussion in part III(B), infra.
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dures in the absence of a valid tribal-state compact if five conditions are met: (1) the
tribe has requested the state to enter negotiations for a Class III gaming compact, (2)
The state and the tribe failed to negotiate a compact within 180 days, (3) the Indian
tribe has brought suit against the state in federal court alleging that the state failed to
negotiate or failed to negotiate in good faith, (4) the state raised its Eleventh Amend-
ment defense, and (5) the district court dismissed the action because of a lack of juris-
diction due to the state's sovereign immunity.
54
If these conditions are met, the tribe may submit a proposal to the Secretary that
contains, among other things, a description of the planned gaming enterprise and a set
of proposed procedures to govern all Class III gaming within the operation. After the
Secretary receives the tribe's proposal and determines that the tribe is eligible under
the five conditions listed above, the governor and attorney general of the state will
have sixty days to comment on whether the state agrees with the tribe's proposal,
whether the state believes it negotiated in good faith with the tribe, and whether the
tribe's proposed gaming activities are permitted in the state for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity. In addition, the state is allowed to submit an alternative
proposal to the tribe's proposed Class III gaming procedures. If the state offers an
alternative proposal, the tribe will be given 60 days to offer any objections to the state
proposal. If the tribe has no objections, the Secretary may choose to approve or disap-
prove the state's proposed regulations. If the tribe does have objections to the state's
alternative proposal, then the Secretary would appoint a mediator who would select the
proposal that best comports with the IGRA and applicable federal law. Upon receiving
the mediator's decision, the Secretary would have the power to either accept the
mediator's decision or reject it and prescribe appropriate procedures on his own.55
In the event that a state does not submit an alternative to the tribe's proposed
regulations, the Secretary would have the power to determine, among other things,
whether the contemplated Class III gaming activities are permitted in the state for any
purposes by any person, whether the proposal is consistent with relevant state law, and
whether the state did in fact negotiate in good faith. After making these determina-
tions, the Secretary would then be able to approve or disapprove the tribe's proposed
regulations, or call an informal conference between the tribe and the state. Once the
Secretary's approval of the proposed regulations is printed in the Federal Register, the
tribe would be able to engage in Class III gaming, despite the absence of a valid tribal-
state compact.5
B. The Secretary's Proposed Regulations Exceed His Lawful Authority
1. The Case Law
Judicial opinions addressing the Secretary of the Interior's authority to issue
regulations allowing Class III gaming in the absence of a tribal-state compact are quite
rare. In support of his authority to issue these regulations, the Secretary cites the cir-
cuit court opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida." Without analysis or extensive com-
ment, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in that case briefly endorses the concept of a
tribal appeal to the Secretary of the Interior, stating, "[i]f the state pleads an Eleventh
54. Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. at 3294-95.
55. See id. at 3295-96.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 3290.
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Amendment defense, the suit is dismissed, and the tribe, pursuant to 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii), then may notify the Secretary of the Interior of the tribe's failure
to negotiate a compact with the state. The Secretary then may prescribe regulations
governing Class III gaming on the tribe's lands."' In considering the Seminole case
on appeal, the Supreme Court declined to rule on this part of the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion, neither endorsing nor denouncing the concept of Secretarial rule making in the
absence of a tribal-state compact." According to one prominent jurist, "[ilt is not
clear whether the Supreme Court would agree that these substitute procedures are
authorized by the [IGRA] Act." The only other Circuit to speak on the issue has
taken a contrary view to that of the Eleventh Circuit. In Spokane Tribe of Indians v.
Washington, the Ninth Circuit sharply and systematically criticized the Eleventh
Circuit's endorsement of Secretarial rule-making:
The Eleventh Circuit was concerned by the regulatory void that it might leave by
invalidating the IGRA's provisions for federal judicial enforcement.... The Elev-
enth Circuit reasoned that a void was not necessary because the provisions of the
statute authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to impose regulations would come
into effect once a state asserted immunity from suit. When that occurred the Secre-
tary of the Interior would, in the Eleventh Circuit's view, remain authorized to
impose regulations for Class III gaming. In our view, however, such a result would
pervert the congressional plan. This is because the Secretary of the Interior under
the statute is to act only as a matter of last resort, and then only after consulting
with the court appointed mediator who has become familiar with the positions and
interests of both the tribes and the states in court directed negotiations. The Elev-
enth Circuit's solution would turn the Secretary of the Interior into a federal czar,
contrary to the congressional aim of state participation."
Despite the Ninth Circuit's pointed criticism of the idea that the Secretary might
prescribe rules for Class III gaming in the absence of a tribal-state compact, the court
seemed to hedge a little in the wake of the Supreme Court's Seminole ruling. In United
States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, the government sought an injunction prohibiting the
tribe from engaging in Class III gaming in the absence of a tribal-state compact.62
Noting that the Supreme Court's Seminole ruling left the Spokane Tribe with no appar-
ent legal remedy when negotiations with the State of Washington broke down, the
Ninth Circuit held that an injunction blocking the tribe from engaging in Class III
gaming without a valid tribal-state compact would not be proper under the circum-
stances.63 Commenting on its opposition to Secretarial rule-making in the absence of a
tribal-state compact, the court admitted that, "the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion is a lot
closer to Congress' intent than mechanically enforcing the IGRA against tribes even
58. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, II F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994) (dictum), affd on other
grounds, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
59. Although the Court noted the Eleventh Circuit's solution, it specifically declined to address the
question of whether Secretarial rule-making would be proper in the absence of a tribal-state compact.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 n.4, 76 n.18 (1996). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
appeared to endorse the solution offered by the Eleventh Circuit. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 99
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. CANBY, supra note 12, at 310.
61. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
62. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).
63. Id. at 1301.
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when states refuse to negotiate."' Mechanical enforcement of the IGRA's compacting
requirement in the absence of any tribal remedy would indeed be inequitable. As the
next two sections point out, however, the Ninth Circuit's original criticism of secretari-
al rule-making remains logically sound and legally compelling.
2. The Statutes
Assuming that the rest of the IGRA survives the Seminole court's striking of
federal jurisdiction over tribal-state litigation,' the text of the statute itself may pres-
ent serious problems to the Secretary of the Interior's proposed regulations. In support-
ing his assertion that he is authorized to issue Class III gaming regulations in the ab-
sence of a valid tribal-state compact, the Secretary of the Interior argues that section
2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) of the IGRA grants him the appropriate authority.' This section of
the IGRA, however, contemplates secretarial rule-making under circumstances that are
very different from those envisioned in the proposed regulations. Under the IGRA,
secretarial rule-making is used only as a last resort in the event that adjudication and
mediation fail to produce a tribal-state compact.
Specifically, the IGRA authorizes the Secretary to create Class III gaming proce-
dures only after a judicial finding of bad faith on the part of the state67 and a selec-
tion from among proposed regulations by a court appointed mediator.' The
Secretary's proposed rules, by contrast, allow for secretarial rule-making without any
findings of fact by a court and without any consideration of the issues by a court-ap-
pointed mediator. Under the proposed rules, in the event that a state offers alternative
Class III gaming regulations to those sought by the tribe, the Secretary would be au-
thorized to prescribe regulations on his own after a mediator appointed by the Secre-
tary himself has considered the issues.' Should the state choose not to submit an al-
64. Id. at 1302.
65. There has been some debate over whether the portion of the IGRA stricken by the Court is
'severable' from the rest of the statute. Although the IGRA itself contains a severability clause, 25
U.S.C.A. § 2721 (West Supp. 1998), some scholars have questioned whether and to what extent the
rest of the statute has survived the Seminole decision. See, e.g., Skibine, supra note 48, at 132-42.
The Secretary's proposed rules, however, proceed on the implicit assumption that the IGRA is still in
effect, and are an attempt to end the stalemate that would occur if a tribe sued a state under the
statute and the state asserted its Eleventh Amendment defense. Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 3290. In hearings held shortly after the Seminole decision, Associate Deputy Attorney General
Seth Waxman testified that, "our view is quite emphatically that the Supreme Court's decision in Semi-
nole does not negate or eliminate most of IGRA, or, indeed, any of IGRA." Oversight Hearing on the
Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Florida,
104th Cong. 7 (1996) (statement of Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney General). Should the
rest of the IGRA be found to not survive the Seminole decision, then regulation of Indian gaming
would presumably return to the common law under Cabazon Band.
66. Class Ill Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289, 3290 (1998) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt.
291) (proposed Jan. 22, 1998). Section 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) of the IGRA reads, "If the State does not
consent during the 60-day period described in clause (vi) to a proposed compact submitted by a medi-
ator under clause (v), the mediator shall notify the Secretary and the Secretary shall prescribe, in con-
sultation with the Indian tribe, procedures-
([) which are consistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator under clause (iv),
the provisions of this chapter and the relevant provisions of the laws of the State, and
(11) under which Class III gaming may be conducted on the Indian lands over which the Indian
tribe has jurisdiction." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (1994).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
68. See id., § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
69. Class Ill Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. at 3296.
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temative proposal, the proposed rules would authorize the Secretary to create Class III
gaming regulations after the Secretary himself has considered the issue of good faith
on the part of the state.7
The Secretary supports this innovative adaptation of the powers given him by the
IGRA by stating, "[w]hen Congress has not 'directly spoken to the precise question at
issue,' courts 'must sustain the Secretary's approach so long as it is based on a reason-
able construction of the statute."'7' The Secretary's construction of the IGRA appears
anything but reasonable, however, when one reads the statute as a whole from begin-
ning to end. Reading the statute makes it clear that the Secretary may only prescribe
Class III gaming regulations on his own after a judicial finding of bad faith on the part
of the state and after a selection from among alternative proposals by a court-appoint-
ed mediator. The Ninth Circuit has specifically noted that the limited rule-making au-
thority granted to the Secretary by the IGRA should be used only under the conditions
set out by the statute.72 It is a well-known maxim of statutory construction that stat-
utes are to be read and construed as a whole.73 Read in its entirety, the IGRA does
not grant the Secretary of the Interior the authority to promulgate Class III gaming
procedures under the circumstances contemplated in his proposed rules.
In addition to the IGRA itself, the Secretary cites two additional parts of the U.S.
Code, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9,74 to support his assertion of authority to issue Class III
gaming regulations in the absence of a tribal-state compact. 7 These sections are gen-
erally considered to grant the Secretary wide discretion in his management of Indian
affairs 6 and at least one expert has commented that these sections lend greater sup-
port to the Secretary's position than does the IGRA itself.'
Despite the Secretary's broad authority in the area of Indian affairs, however, he
may not issue a regulation in contravention of federal law. In Chevron, U.SA. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court held, "[i]f the intent of Congress
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."' Under the standard es-
tablished in Chevron, it appears that the Secretary's proposed regulations are not with-
in his authority. According to the text of the IGRA, "[cilass III gaming activities shall
be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are -. .. (C) conducted in confor-
mance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State ....
,,79 Given that the Secretary's proposed rules would give him the authority to pro-
70. Id.
71. Id. at 3290 (quoting from Auer v. Robbins, 117 S.Ct. 905, 909 (1997)).
72. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994). See discussion in
part III(B)(l) of this note.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
74. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) reads as follows: "TMe Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may pre-
scribe, have the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations." 25
U.S.C. § 9 (1994) reads as follows: "The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think fit
for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settle-
ment of the accounts of Indian affairs."
75. Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. at 3290.
76. See Skibine, supra note 48, at 142.
77. Id. at 150.
78. Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); accord,
Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990).
79. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l).
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mulgate procedures and allow Class III gaming to go forward without a tribal-state
compact, they are in direct conflict with the plain meaning of the IGRA. The Supreme
Court has stated that, "where ... a statute's language is plain, the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms."' In addition, the Court has ruled, "[in
construing a statute, we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used." The plain words of the IGRA make it clear that Class III gaming may only
take place under a valid tribal-state compact. Despite the Secretary of the Interior's
broad authority in the area of Indian affairs, the clear command of the statute is un-
avoidable.
The Congressional history of the IGRA lends solid support to the statute's com-
mand that no Class III gaming be conducted in the absence of a tribal-state compact.
In its report to the full Senate on the IGRA, the Senate Indian Affairs Committee
made its intentions perfectly explicit: "S. 555 [the IGRA] does not contemplate and
does not provide for the conduct of Class III gaming activities on Indian lands in the
absence of a tribal-state compact."' After the Supreme Court's Seminole ruling, Con-
gress continued to assert its position that no Class III gaming be conducted without a
tribal-state compact in place. In an amendment to the Department of the Interior Ap-
propriations Act for fiscal 1998, Congress commanded:
mhe Secretary may not expend any funds made available under this Act to review
or approve any Tribal-State compact for Class III gaming entered into on or after
the day of enactment of this Act. This provision shall not apply to any Tribal-State
compact which has been approved by a state in accordance with State law and the
Indian gaming regulatory act.'
In addition, Congress stated, "[i]t is the sense of the Senate that the United States De-
partment of Justice should vigorously enforce the provisions of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act requiring an approved Tribal-State gaming compact prior to the initia-
tion of Class III gaming on Indian lands."'" Although the first of these two provisions
is curiously worded, taken together they plainly show that Congress meant exactly
what it said when it passed the IGRA: no Class III gaming in the absence of a tribal-
state compact.
In the time since the Secretary has proposed his regulations, there have been
additional moves in Congress to re-assert the position originally taken in the IGRA.
Shortly after the Secretary's proposed rules where published, Senator Richard Bryan
introduced a bill to prohibit directly the Secretary from promulgating his proposed
regulations.' Calling the Secretary's proposed rules a "clear violation of the intent of
Congress,"' Senator Bryan opined that the Secretary was "overstepping his authority
and ... making a grave mistake."' A companion bill was also introduced in the
House of Representatives by Congressman Jim Gibbons.' Although the measure
80. United States v. Ron Pair Enters. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
81. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
82. S. REP. No. 100-446, supra note 37, at 6, reprinted at 3076.
83. Department of the Interior Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-83, II1 Stat. 1543, 1569
(1997).
84. Id. 111 Stat. at 1570.
85. S. 1572, 105th Cong. (1998)
86. 144 CONG. REC. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
87. Id. at S49.
88. H.R. 3094, 105th Cong. (1998).
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eventually became an amendment89 to the 1998 Emergency Supplemental Appropria-
tions Act,' it was not included in the final version.9 These latest legislative
maneuvers do not bode well for the future of the Secretary's proposed rules, and they
provide yet another sign of Congress' antipathy towards the possibility of Class III
gaming on Indian lands without a tribal-state compact.
In support of his proposed regulations, the Secretary of the Interior explained
that enforcement of the tribal-state compacting requirement for Class III gaming, in
combination with the lack of any remedy for a tribe should a state assert its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit, would award a state, "a veto over all Class III gam-
ing within its borders." The Secretary then asserted, quite truthfully, that
"[C]ongress did not contemplate or authorize such a state veto in the IGRA." 3 As
mentioned earlier, the inequity of mechanically enforcing the IGRA's compacting
requirement in the absence of a judicial remedy for the tribes has been noted by the
Ninth Circuit.94 The regulations proposed by the Secretary, however, would vest in
the hands of one person both the judicial power to make a finding of bad faith on the
part of a state and the legislative power to prescribe Class III gaming regulations in the
absence of a tribal-state compact.
Although Congress did not contemplate a state veto over Class III gaming, it also
did not intend to vest these powers in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior. The
Secretary's proposed regulations, if officially promulgated, would stand in clear viola-
tion of the plain language of the IGRA and the abundantly expressed intent of Con-
gress.
C. The Secretary's Proposed Regulations Would Skew the Balance Between
Tribal and State Interests Created by the IGRA.
The Secretary's proposed rules, if officially enacted and used to approve Class
III gaming over a state's protests, would surely breed litigation that challenges their
validity. Even if the proposed rules are eventually upheld in the courts, however, they
pose serious problems from a policy perspective. In order to understand the policy
implications of the Secretary's proposed rules, it is first necessary to briefly discuss
two related issues that have generated a fair amount of controversy under the IGRA.
Of the many issues litigated under the IGRA, two of the most contentious have been
the proper "scope of gaming" and the proper nature of "good faith."
One of the most hotly debated areas of Indian gaming law is the "scope of gam-
ing" issue. This issue arises from the requirement in the IGRA that a tribe can only
engage in Class III gaming if the state within which it is located permits, "such gam-
ing for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity."' This provision, appar-
ently inspired by the Supreme Court's holding in Cabazon, has been subject to wildly
varying interpretations. Tribes have argued that the provision allows them to engage in
a wide range of gambling activities not specifically prohibited in all instances by the
89. S.Amdt. 2133, 105th Cong. (1998).
90. H.R. 3579 § 409, 105th Cong. (1998).
91. See Pub. L. No. 105-174, 112 Stat. 58 (1998).
92. Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. at 3291.
93. Id.
94. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1998).
95. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B) (1994).
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state, while the National Governor's Association has taken the position that tribal gam-
ing should be subject to all of the restrictions that apply to all other gambling within
the state."
Congress has not yet clarified the proper scope of Class III gaming under the
IGRA, and the subject has been a matter of interpretation for the courts. The Second
Circuit, for example, has held that if a state permits some forms of Class IlI gaining,
then it must negotiate with a tribe for a Class HI gaming compact that is not necessari-
ly limited to those specific forms of Class III gaming that are permitted under the
state's laws.' The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, have held that a state
has no duty to negotiate with a tribe over those particular types of Class III gaming
that are not permitted in any way by state law."
Closely related to the scope of gaming issue is the question of what constitutes
"good faith" under the IGRA. The IGRA itself specifies that a court may consider the
public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and the adverse economic
impact on existing gaming activity in determining whether a state has negotiated in
good faith." In addition, any demand by the state to tax the Indian tribe or its lands
is to be considered evidence of bad faith."m In practice, the meaning of good faith
under the Act can become closely tied to the court's determination of the proper
"scope of gaming." In the Second Circuit's Mashantucket decision, for example, the
court ruled that because the State of Connecticut refused to negotiate with the tribe on
some types of gaming that the court later found to be within the proper scope of gam-
ing, the state had in fact negotiated in bad faith.10'
Whatever their proper contours, the issues of good faith and scope of gaming
presented a crucial legal and fact-finding task for the courts under the IGRA. Under
the Secretary of the Interior's proposed rules, in the event that a state asserted its Elev-
enth Amendment immunity to suit in federal court by a tribe, the Secretary himself
would assume the judicial tasks of determining good faith and defining the proper
scope of Class III gaming"°m . Section 291.8 of the proposed rules provides for secre-
tarial review of a tribe's Class III gaming proposal. This section gives the Secretary
the power to determine, among other things, "whether contemplated gaming activities
are permitted in the State for any purposes by any person, organization, or entity,"' 3
"whether the proposal is consistent with relevant provisions of the laws of the
State,' '1°4 and "whether the state has negotiated in good faith."' "tm After making
96. See Levin, supra note 19, at 128.
97. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1990).
98. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir. 1993); Rumsey Indi-
an Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(iii)(I).
100. Id. at § 2710(d)(7)(A)(iii)(l1).
101. Mashantucket, 913 F.2d at 1032-33. At least one writer has embraced this objective approach
to the good faith issue, arguing that a state's erroneous interpretation of the IGRA should not save the
state from a judicial finding that the state acted in bad faith when it refused to negotiate on those
forms of Class III gaming that it mistakenly believed to be outside of the legal scope of gaming.
Nancy McKay, Comment, The Meaning of Good Faith Under The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 27
GONZAGA L. REV. 471, 485 (1991/1992).
102. Although it is well recognized that Congress may delegate adjudicatory functions to adminis-
trative agencies, see 1 JACOB C. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 3.03[6], at 3-113 (1998), the
IGRA makes no such delegation to the Secretary of the Interior and instead provides that a federal
court make any finding of bad faith on the part of a state.
103. Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg.3289, 3295 (1998).
104. Id. at 3296.
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these determinations, the Secretary is empowered to approve the tribe's proposal and
allow Class III gaming to go forward, despite any objection by the state. Senator Rich-
ard Bryan, when introducing his bill to specifically block these regulations, attacked
this concentration of powers in the hands of the Secretary, saying, "the Department [of
the Interior] asserts the States must be acting in bad faith for the Secretary to strip the
states of their rights. Of course, the Secretary is judge and jury over whether the
States, in fact, are negotiating in bad faith."'" In response to such concerns, a sup-
porter of the prospect of secretarial rule making has asserted that, "[niothing indicates
that the Secretary could not be trusted ... to make a fair determination that a state has
not negotiated in good faith.,,""e
The validity of this assertion is called into serious doubt, however, when one
examines the nature of the relationship between the federal government and the Indian
tribes. The federal government, and the executive branch in particular, has traditionally
had a special relationship with the Indian tribes. Known generally as the 'federal trust
relationship,' the bond between the federal government and the tribes is comprised of a
mixture of moral obligations and legal duties that is comparable to the duties owed by
a trustee to a beneficiary.' °
The federal trust relationship with the tribes has its foundations in Chief Justice
Marshall's Cherokee Nation v. Georgia opinion."° In defining the relationship be-
tween the tribes and the federal government, Marshall wrote, "[tiheir relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government
for protection; rely upon its kindness and power; appeal to it for relief to their
wants.""' A significant aspect of the trust duty owed by the federal government to
the tribes has been to protect tribal interests from the potentially adverse interests of
the several states. This aspect of the federal trust duty was explained in United States
v. Kagama, where the Court wrote, "These Indian tribes are the wards of the na-
tion .... They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protec-
tion .... [L]argely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them,
and the treaties in which it has been pronounced, there arises the duty of
protection.' In general, the essence of the federal trust relationship can be summed
up as a duty, on the part of the federal government, to serve the best interests of the
tribes and their members." 2
105. Id.
106. 144 CONG. REC. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan). On the specific
issue of scope of gaming, the Secretary has chosen, in the preface to his proposed rules, to announce
his own interpretation of the issue. Setting aside the Ninth Circuit's holding in the Rumsey decision,
the Secretary adopted a rationale proposed by the United States' amicus brief in that case. Under the
view endorsed by the Secretary, "if a state prohibits an entire class of traditional games, it need not
negotiate over particular games in that category." 63 Fed. Reg. at 3293. This rationale, which gives a
more diminished effect to state laws than the holding of the court in Rumsey, has been attacked by
the Western Governor's Association as a "clearly skewed legal interpretation." Letter from Tom
Knowles, Chairman, The Western Governors Association, to William Clinton, President of the United
States (Dec. 5, 1997) reprinted in 144 Cong. Rec. S49 (daily ed. Jan 27, 1998).
107. Skibine, supra note 48, at 142.
108. See generally, CANBY, supra note 12, at 33-34.
109. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
110. Id. at 17.
Ill. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
112. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Para-
digm For Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 109, 114.
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Because responsibility for management of all Indian affairs rests with the Secre-
tary of the Interior,"3 the Secretary is the cabinet-level executive officer that is ulti-
mately responsible for fulfilling the federal government's duty of trust and protection
to the tribes. Under the Secretary's proposed regulations, however, he would be called
upon in certain circumstances to fulfill the role of impartial judge in the context of a
tribal-state dispute over Class III gaming. It is easy to imagine a state that, for reasons
ranging from fear of organized crime to fear of competition with state lotteries or
state-regulated private casinos, would wish to block certain types of Class III gaming
on Indian lands within its borders. In addition, this state could be engaged in a dispute
with an Indian tribe whose best interests, in terms of economic development and em-
ployment for tribal members, call for an enterprise featuring a full range of Class III
gaming activities. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the Secretary
could fulfill his trust duty to act in the best interests of the tribe and, at the same time,
fulfilling his duties under the proposed regulations to both accurately interpret the
proper scope of gaming and serve as a neutral arbiter of good faith on the part of the
state.
Logically, it appears difficult, if not impossible, for the Secretary to faithfully
pursue the tribe's best interests while fairly adjudicating the conflicting interests of the
state. The judicial remedy set out in the IGRA, which calls for a neutral federal court
to adjudicate tribal-state disputes and consider the question of good faith, was intended
by Congress to "balanc[e] the interests of tribes to engage in gaming against the inter-
ests of States in regulating such gaming."" 4 By placing the adjudication of tribal-
state disputes into the hands of an official with a moral and legal duty to pursue the
best interests of the tribes, the Secretary's proposed rules do both parties a disservice
and badly skew the balance of interests intended by Congress when it wrote the IGRA.
IV. A Possible Alternative: Federal Duty to Litigate on Behalf of the Indian
Tribes - Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson
Given that states have a valid Eleventh Amendment defense to any suit brought
against them by an Indian tribe in federal court, what type of remedy for the tribes
would protect tribal interests while continuing to preserve the careful balancing inter-
ests achieved in the original IGRA?
In late 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California en-
dorsed a solution in Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson"5 that preserves the IGRA's
intention that a federal judge be the arbiter of good faith and avoids the drawbacks of
the Secretary of the Interior's proposed rules. In Chemehuevi, there were seven
plaintiff Indian tribes that had sought to negotiate with California's Governor Wilson
in order to enter into Class IlI gaming compacts. Governor Wilson refused to negoti-
ate, however, until he concluded a separate Class III compact with a tribe not involved
in the case. In addition, the Governor insisted that the tribes cease all Class III gaming
activities currently conducted on their lands before negotiations could move forward.
The tribes, believing that the Governor was not acting in good faith, and noting that
the Supreme Court's Seminole decision left them with no direct cause of action against
the state of California, requested the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Califor-
113. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
114. S. REP. No. 100-446, supra note 37, at 14, reprinted at 3084.
115. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 987 F.Supp. 804 (N.D. Ca. 1997).
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nia and the U.S. Department of Justice to represent them in a suit to compel Governor
Wilson to begin good faith negotiations over Class III gaming. When the U.S. Attor-
ney and the Department of Justice refused to take action of behalf of the tribes, the
tribes filed suit seeking declaratory relief against the United States.""
Relying on the intent behind the IGRA and the nature of the federal
government's fiduciary duty to the tribes, Magistrate Judge Zimmerman declared that
the United States had a mandatory duty to prosecute an action against the State of
California on behalf of the tribes in order to enforce their rights under the IGRA to
negotiate for a Class III gaming compact." 7 In analyzing the tribes' claim, the court
first noted that agencies such as the Department of Justice generally have complete
discretion over whether they will prosecute a claim or enforce a statute." 8 Seeking to
avoid the general rule, the tribes pointed to 25 U.S.C. § 175. The section, in its entire-
ty, reads: "In all States and Territories where there are reservations or allotted Indians
the United States attorney [United States District Attorney] shall represent them in all
suits at law and equity.""' The only case specifically analyzing the United States
Attorney's duty to sue on behalf of the tribes under section 175 is Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes v. Reno."'°
In Shoshone-Bannock, the court held that neither section 175 nor the federal
government's general fiduciary relationship with the tribes could limit the Attorney
General's discretion in refusing to assert the tribes' claims to water rights in Idaho's
Snake River basin.'2' As the Chemehuevi court is quick to point out,"r however,
two of the judges in Shoshone-Bannock concurred specially in order to emphasize that
the holding of the court in that case was confined to the facts of the case as applied to
the substantive law (the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868) on which the tribes' claims was
based." As concurring Judges Rogers and Wald point out, the Shoshone-Bannock
court, "ha[d] no occasion to decide what the scope of the government's duties would
be in a more compelling circumstance."' 4 In declaring that the United States had a
duty to litigate on behalf of the tribes to enforce their rights under the IGRA, the
Chemehuevi court argued that the situation of the tribes presented just such a "more
compelling circumstance."'" In the words of the court, "[w]hatever the full extent of
the fiduciary relationship, it certainly should include a duty to represent the plaintiffs
in a situation where, absent representation, the Tribes will have no legal remedy with
which to bring the state to the bargaining table and obtain the benefits of IGRA as
Congress intended."'26
In addition to the government's fiduciary relationship with the tribes, the
Chemehuevi court drew upon the IGRA itself in order to support its holding. Noting
116. See id. at 807-806. The Eleventh Amendment would not prohibit a federal suit by the United
States against one of the several states. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983).
117. Id. at 809.
118. Id. at 806. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979).
119. 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1994).
120. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 1482.
122. Chemehuevi, 987 F.Supp. at 808.
123. Shoshone-Bannock, 56 F.3d at 1484.
124. Id.
125. Chemehuevi, 987 F.Supp. at 808.
126. Id. at 809.
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the Ninth Circuit's opposition to the concept of Secretarial rule making in the absence
of a tribal-state compact'" and Congress' intent in creating a federal judicial remedy
for the tribes,'28 the court extolled the virtues of a government duty to litigate in fed-
eral court on behalf of the tribes:
A duty on behalf of the United States to sue the State to bring it to the bargaining
table can certainly be implied from IGRA, since it appears that this is the only
legal remedy available to the plaintiff Tribes to seek the benefits Congress intended
them to have and to preserve the balance Congress carefully struck between the
interests of the states and the tribes.129'
Whether the holding of the Chemehuevi court will be endorsed by higher courts re-
mains to be seen. In United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, the Ninth Circuit noted
the holding in Chemehuevi, but declined to address the question of a government duty
to litigate on behalf of the tribes."3
Overall, the concept endorsed in Chemehuevi appears to be the most attractive
solution to the predicament facing the tribes in the wake of the Supreme Court's Semi-
nole holding. A duty on the part of the U.S. Attorney to litigate for the tribes would
protect the tribes' right to negotiate under the IGRA while preventing the troublesome
concentration of powers contemplated in the Secretary of the Interior's proposed rules.
Also, a government duty to litigate would most closely track the procedure set out in
the original IGRA. In the event that a tribe believes that a state has not bargained in
good faith, it can, without violating the Eleventh Amendment, compel a state to litigate
the matter before neutral and detached federal court.
V. Conclusion
In the midst of the legal battles raging over Indian gaming, it is important to
keep an eye on the benefits that have accrued to those tribes and states that have en-
tered into cooperative gaming compacts under the IGRA. There are currently over 150
tribal-state compacts in place,' 3' and the Indian gaming business has bloomed into a
$6 billion industry.'32 Gaming enterprises have benefitted the tribes in the form of in-
creased employment, decreased dependence of tribal members on welfare payments,
and improvements in tribal housing, education, and health care systems."' In addi-
tion, the states have reaped economic benefits from Indian gaming. In a 1997 study on
the impact of Indian gaming in New Mexico, for example, the author found that, "the
overall employment and fiscal impact on surrounding communities can be fiscally
positive."" In Wisconsin, where Class III Indian gaming has been conducted since
the passage of the IGRA, average per capita sales in service related businesses have
grown 50 percent since 1988."35 Realizing the possible economic benefits of Indian
127. Id. at n.1.
128. Id. at n.4.
129. Id. at 808.
130. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1297 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998).
131. CANBY, supra note 49, at 312.
132. Spreading Their Bets, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1998, at 6.
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29 ARIz. ST. LJ. 205, 231 (1997).




gaming, some states have taken affirmative measures designed to end tribal-state stand-
offs over Class III gaming compacts. Arizona, for example, passed an initiative requir-
ing the governor to enter into a "standard form" Class III gaming compact with any
tribe that requests it."
In the absence of such innovative state law measures, however, conflict between
the states and the tribes over Class III gaming is bound to continue, especially in those
states that perceive the growth of Indian gaming to be a threat to public policy. With
the economic future of many Indian tribes and the fate of a $6 billion industry hanging
in the balance, the need for an evenhanded solution to the quandary created by the
Supreme Court's Seminole ruling is particularly pressing. The Secretary of the
Interior's proposed regulations, however, would only make matters worse. In addition
to violating the text of the IGRA and the clearly expressed intent of Congress, the
Secretary's proposed rules would concentrate an inordinate amount of power in the
hands of the Secretary and badly skew the balancing of interests achieved in the
IGRA. A much better solution is the concept endorsed in the Chemehuevi decision-a
government duty to litigate the issue of good faith on behalf of the tribes. This solu-
tion, which is consistent with the federal government's fiduciary duty to the Indian
tribes, would best mirror the process intended by Congress when it passed the IGRA.
Under a government duty to litigate, the tribes would have an effective means of en-
forcing their right to bargain for Class IUI gaming compacts and the states would be
ensured a neutral and detached forum for the arbitration of good faith.
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